

# Simonds Ranks Riga Settlement High in World's History.

Comparable With Treaties Made at Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna in Its Influence on Europe's Future

With to-day's edition of THE NEW YORK HERALD Frank H. Simonds becomes a regular contributor to its columns. No man is better equipped to tell the meaning of the great events constantly developing in Europe. Mr. Simonds will discuss the remaking and the reshaping of that continent in these columns every Sunday, and also in special articles during the week, as occasion shall arise.

In to-day's article Mr. Simonds deals with the frontiers of Europe as fixed by the treaty of Versailles and compares them with those left by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The changes are remarkably insignificant, he finds, especially in the west, while in the east and south there are several great changes, some of which, in the view of the writer, will be difficult to preserve without fighting for them. Unless France is prepared to buttress several of the small nations until they are able to stand alone he thinks middle Europe may become, sooner than pacifists would like to reckon, again a field of wars.

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

In several recent articles I have discussed the Armistice of Riga—that is, the preliminary peace settlement between the Russians and the Poles—as it affected the latter country and as it affected the destinies of the future relations of European States. But the settlement at Riga has a far wider significance. We are, in fact, in the presence of one more, the fourth in order, of those great settlements of European territories since the close of the Thirty Years War, which is generally accepted as marking the beginning of Modern History.

Taken together, the treaties signed at Paris and the Riga document, to which must be added a number of subordinate agreements, like those between the Baltic States and Russia, constitute a settlement wholly comparable in magnitude and in importance to those of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna. The liquidation of the German war, like the liquidation of the wars of the Reformation, of Louis XIV., of the French Revolution and of Napoleon, must open a new page in world history.

Europe Governed for 100 Years by Decisions of the Vienna Congress.

It is interesting and not without value for the future, then, to examine this latest European settlement having regard to its relation to the last. From the fall of Napoleon in 1815 to August, 1917—that is, from the battle of Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium by the Kaiser's armies a hundred years later—Europe has been, in the main, controlled by the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, and its history is the slow escape of certain nations from decisions which were grossly unfair and the futile attempt of others to revise terms which were equitable and bid fair to be permanent.

Looking now to the map of western Europe, to that portion of the continent lying west of a line drawn from Berlin to Rome, how does the settlement of 1919-1920 compare with that of 1814-1815? Considering that a full century of wars separates the two arrangements, the first circumstance which must impress every observer is the paucity of the changes as between peoples. It is true that the century has seen the separation of the territories united under the crown of Holland in 1815 into three distinct units, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg; in the same fashion instead of an Italy which was a memory rather than a fact in 1815, a hopeless tangle of petty principalities, there has emerged a united Italy, become one of the great Powers of Europe. Germany, too, has gone through the same process.

Yet while these internal changes in the conditions of races or nationalities have been enormous, by contrast the mutations between the several races, to which the contemporary map of Europe bears testimony, are almost insignificant. To begin with, so far as Great Britain, Spain, Switzerland, and Portugal are concerned there has been no change whatever. As between Belgium and France, Holland and Germany, Italy and Switzerland, no change.

Actually more than a century of crowded history in western Europe has resulted in but three changes of any extent, one of which is purely provisional. The Treaty of Versailles, while in the main accepting the line of 1815 between the Belgian people, then Dutch subjects and now independent, and the German, has assigned to the former rather less than 400 square miles of territory east of Liege, constituting the districts of Malmédy and Eupen, with the one and a half square miles of Moresnet, overlooked a century ago. This change, moreover, does no more than rectify a mistake of the earlier treaty, since the majority of the 75,000 people dwelling in this region are not only Walloon but have recently signified their satisfaction with the transfer to Belgian rule.

In the second place, while accepting the frontier drawn between France and Germany—that is, between the French monarchy and the Prussian and Bavarian kingdoms of 1815—the Treaty of Versailles has reopened a dispute which filled the records of the negotiations a century ago by creating the Sarre district and bestowing upon the inhabitants the right fifteen years hence to vote for France, Germany or independent status. More than half of this Sarre Basin was French before the Revolution, half of it

was assigned to France following the first abdication of Napoleon; this half was not actually taken from France until after Waterloo.

As between the German people and their western neighbors, then, the recent settlement accepts the settlement of a century ago except as to 1,000 square miles and approximately three-quarters of a million of people. As to these it leaves the decision with the people themselves, and the districts adjoining the Belgian frontiers have already accepted the Belgian nationality, while those adjoining the French have still to vote fourteen years hence.

Insignificant Changes in Frontiers Affected Since 1815.

Looking now to the frontiers between Italy and France and recalling that a century ago it was Sardinia, not Italy, which touched France, one must note a very considerable change from the situation recognized a century ago. France has extended her frontiers to the Alps, annexing Savoy and Nice, with the major fraction of the old principality of the Grimaldi, the lesser portion of which still endures in the principality of Monaco. But this change was the result, not of war between the French and Italians, but of amicable agreement following French assistance in liberating Italy. Moreover, the inhabitants are French; sixty years ago they decided almost unanimously for the French association and both peoples have accepted the decision as final.

We are bound to recognize, then, that the decisions of 1815, as far as the territorial adjustments between the western nations of Europe were concerned, has stood the test of a hundred years, and the sole changes due to war do not exceed four hundred square miles, with the possible increase to slightly more than a thousand if the Sarre decides later to separate from Germany.

Looking to the north of Europe it will be seen that Norway and Sweden, joined in 1815 to reimburse the Swedes for the loss of Finland, assigned to Russia, have separated, but so far as the rest of the world is concerned their frontiers remain the same. As to Denmark there has been a greater change. By the Austro-Prussian war in the middle of the last century Denmark lost all of Schleswig-Holstein. At Paris a year ago two plebiscite areas were created in the regions of Schleswig, where the Danes were an important element; in one of these the vote has already been for Denmark, in the other for Germany. Thus an injustice of 1815 has been fairly remedied in 1919. In addition, the island of Heligoland, British in 1815, has passed by private sale from Britain to Germany in the last century, and the new treaty does not modify this circumstance.

We may say, then, in sum that in 1815 the conquerors of Napoleon gave to western Europe frontiers which have been but little modified since. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1870 has been annulled, and looking at the existing boundaries the statesmen of the Vienna gathering would detect but little modification as between nationalities, despite the colossal transformations within its limits of the several peoples.

Important Changes Resulting from the War in Eastern and Southern Europe.

Looking to the east and south of Europe, however, we are bound to recognize at once the revolutionary character of the changes which are marked by the frontiers of 1920 as contrasted with those of 1815. In fact, three great empires have fallen, the Russian, Austrian and Turkish, while at the expense of the German and Austrian kingdoms of a hundred years ago Poland has been restored. A century ago Turkey still held the line of the Save, the Danube, the Transylvanian Alps and the Pruth. By the terms of the Vienna settlement Russian advance across the Dniester in 1812 was confirmed, while Austria occupied all of the region between the Bug and the Isonzo, out of which so many States have now been fashioned.

But analyzing the changes of a century we shall see that they correspond to certain very clear historical circumstances. We have first to consider the Italian phase. The Congress of Vienna denied to Italy any shadow of unity, even that illusory fraction residing in Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy.



FRANK H. SIMONDS.

But the wars of the nineteenth century gave momentum to the leadership of the House of Savoy supplied a centre for Italian patriotism and led the way to internal consolidation. The Conference of 1919 extended the process by giving to the Italian nation the boundaries of antiquity, the Alps from Switzerland to the Quarnaro, while it hesitated to resolve the dispute between the Southern Slavs and the Italians as to the islands and a portion of the mainland on the eastern side of the Adriatic.

As to Poland, the Paris Conference after long debate and much bitterness resolved to restore substantially those frontiers which were overturned when Frederick the Great undertook his infamous partitions. Posen, West Prussia, in larger part, and a fragment of East Prussia were restored to Polish sovereignty. Danzig was created an amorphous political molecule, depending upon the League of Nations, but in some vague measure reproducing an ancient status. In doing this the Paris Conference went back not to 1815 but to 1772, and in three districts where just decision seemed difficult resort was had to the compromise of a plebiscite. Two of the regions have already voted for Germany; a third, Upper Silesia, has still to decide, but if it chooses German allegiance we shall have restored on the eastern marches of Prussia substantially the frontiers of 1772.

Russia's Frontiers are Practically Those of the Seventeenth Century.

As to Austrian Poland, the Paris Conference found little difficulty in arriving at a decision, because the whole of western Galicia spontaneously turned to Warsaw. As to eastern Galicia there was more controversy, but in the end the result was the same. Thus at Paris Poland received the territories stolen by the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs in the eighteenth century. As to the Russian shares in the spoils of partition, however, Paris found itself unable to reach a decision, and the actual settlement has been by the sword and is set forth in the terms of Riga, which give to Poland not the frontiers of 1772, as in the west, but those of 1793—that is, of the second partition.

As to Russian territory, aside from Poland, Paris was equally unable to make a division and after war the separate Baltic races have arrived at a settlement with the Russians which under the work of Peter the Great and his successors so far as the Baltic shore is concerned. Finland emerges free; Estonia, Livland and Lithuania have been similarly successful in escaping Russian control, although between Lithuania and Poland there survives a quarrel which may have grave consequences in the future.

In sum, however, Russia retreats behind frontiers which recall those of the seventeenth century so far as the Baltic shore is concerned, and in the case of Poland and Finland the conditions of the eighteenth

century are practically those of the eighteenth century. On the whole, then, the settlement of 1919-1920 is a restoration of the frontiers of the eighteenth century, with the addition of a few square miles of territory to Poland and to the Baltic States.

Looking to the east and south of Europe, however, we are bound to recognize at once the revolutionary character of the changes which are marked by the frontiers of 1920 as contrasted with those of 1815. In fact, three great empires have fallen, the Russian, Austrian and Turkish, while at the expense of the German and Austrian kingdoms of a hundred years ago Poland has been restored. A century ago Turkey still held the line of the Save, the Danube, the Transylvanian Alps and the Pruth. By the terms of the Vienna settlement Russian advance across the Dniester in 1812 was confirmed, while Austria occupied all of the region between the Bug and the Isonzo, out of which so many States have now been fashioned.

But analyzing the changes of a century we shall see that they correspond to certain very clear historical circumstances. We have first to consider the Italian phase. The Congress of Vienna denied to Italy any shadow of unity, even that illusory fraction residing in Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy.

Looking to the east and south of Europe, however, we are bound to recognize at once the revolutionary character of the changes which are marked by the frontiers of 1920 as contrasted with those of 1815. In fact, three great empires have fallen, the Russian, Austrian and Turkish, while at the expense of the German and Austrian kingdoms of a hundred years ago Poland has been restored. A century ago Turkey still held the line of the Save, the Danube, the Transylvanian Alps and the Pruth. By the terms of the Vienna settlement Russian advance across the Dniester in 1812 was confirmed, while Austria occupied all of the region between the Bug and the Isonzo, out of which so many States have now been fashioned.

Eastern Question Replaced by Adriatic Problem, While the Old Polish Quarrel Has Been Revived

of border provinces stolen from Poland between 1772 and 1815 and from France between 1814 and 1871. But east and south of Germany, as east and south of France, the changes have been momentous.

New Issues Arise Which Will Make the New Century's History.

And in these changes we must recognize the rise of the new issues which will make the history of the coming century. The Balkan problem, the Eastern question, so far as Europe is concerned, has disappeared with the Turk; all the ambitions of all the great powers in the Balkans have proven equally futile; instead, the several tribes have succeeded in regaining independence and achieving frontiers roughly corresponding with their tribal entities. But in place of the old Eastern question we have the new dispute on the Adriatic between the Southern Slavs and the Italians, which has already poisoned European wells for two long years.

Moreover, in the north there has arisen a new problem, or rather a question which filled the history of Europe for many centuries with the threats and realities of war, namely, the Baltic question, has been revived. Russia has retired from the Baltic, save about the head of the Gulf of Finland, but who can believe that the great Slav State of the future will permanently consent to be separated from the sea by a thin facade of helpless States such as Estonia, Livland and Lithuania, even if all three should seek strength in unity. Yet it will be the policy of all the States interested in the Baltic, of Sweden, Germany and Great Britain, to preserve the independence of these States and thus prevent Russian control of the Baltic.

To the Baltic question there is added the Polish, also of very great antiquity. Poland has escaped from Russian, German and Austrian, but if the disappearance of the Austrian makes Polish escape permanent on this side, if the frontiers Poland has accepted with respect to the Russian leave open the way for an ultimate restoration of friendship between both branches of the Slav family, between the German and the Poles, the frontiers laid down at Versailles represent only an incitation to war. Nor can Poland ever be quite sure that the German and the Russian may not again strike hands and seek to extinguish Polish liberties by dividing Polish lands.

As between the new States erected as a result of recent treaties many disputes of a dangerous character have come with the liberation of the smaller nationalities from the overshadowing menace of great and tyrannical Powers. Thus the Poles and the Lithuanians are at daggers drawn over Vilna; bitterness still survives between Czechs and Poles over Teschen, recently divided between the two, both of whom claimed the whole district. Between the Rumanians and the Serbs there endures the acute and very dangerous dispute over the Banat. Between the German-Austrian fragment now erected into a separate republic and the Jugo-Slavs there is the issue raised by the plebiscite of Klagenfurt, recently decided in favor of the Austrians. Between the Hungarians and all their neighbors there exist disputes having their origin in the determination of the Magyars to regain all of their ancient lands, despite the fact that all of these lands are inhabited by people who prefer other rule to a return to Hungarian supremacy.

Wars Since the Congress of Vienna Due to Natural Forces.

Looking back to the settlement of the Congress of Vienna for a moment we perceive that out of it grew certain distinct conflicts which make up the history of the nineteenth century. The age-long rivalry between the Latin and the German on the Rhine survived to make the war of 1870 and to contribute to the making of that of 1914. France had created in Germany and Italy a longing for national solidarity by her effort to conquer and dominate. As a consequence the German and the Italian peoples struggled upward to race and national solidarity in the wars of the middle of the last century. By refusing to undo the wrong done to the Poles by Frederick the Great the Congress of Vienna preserved a wound in the east of Europe which did not heal and could not be cured.

But the main outcome of the settlement

of Vienna was the inevitable creation of the Eastern Question. The great Russian Empire, emerging from the Napoleonic struggle almost as potent as the United States at the close of the world war, resumed its glacier-like march toward the open waters beyond the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. To meet this thrust, first Britain and France, then Britain and Austria, finally Germany and Austria united. War after war marked the progress of the struggle, the race between the German and the Slav, as it finally developed, for the road to the Near East and the bridge to Asia Minor, which is the peninsula of Constantinople.

It was this rivalry, this race, which really precipitated the world war, although it was complicated by Anglo-German and Franco-German circumstances. And, looking forward to the future, on the basis of the new adjustments, it must be perceived that there is every chance that in the next hundred years the effort of Russia to regain her position on the Baltic and to achieve her conquest of Constantinople, to gain the prize which was in her hands by Anglo-French consent during the world war will be renewed. Thus we may have at one time a new Eastern question and a new Baltic question.

In the nineteenth century Germany (Prussia first and then the German Empire) and Russia were long friends and even allies. The separation between the two, due to the German support of Austrian pretensions in the Near East, was fatal to both dynasties and to both empires. To-day nothing seems at once more momentous and more probable than a new association of the German and the Slav, which will inevitably challenge almost every detail in the settlement of 1919-20, certainly every circumstance save in the west.

Attempt to Disturb Western Frontiers Would Mean Another War.

The world war reestablished the fact, proven so completely in the wars of Louis XIV., that Great Britain will never consent, save after complete defeat, to the establishment of a strong military power in the Low Countries, in Belgium or in Holland. German failure to realize this fact led to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. A new German effort to disturb the frontiers drawn in the west would almost inevitably involve the British again. Therefore, so far as the Alsace-Lorraine question itself is concerned, the settlement of Versailles might seem destined to endure.

But France has necessarily embarked upon a continental policy; in supporting Poland she encounters Germany and perhaps Russia; in giving aid to the Jugo-Slavs, like the Poles, essential elements in her anti-German edifice, she has come almost to blows with Italy. In general, her support of the small States created at Versailles and Riga brings her at once into collision with Germany and Italy, while before Warsaw her generals were responsible for Russian disaster. Moreover, with this department of French policy Britain has neither concern nor sympathy.

Thus, immediately, the problem for the future is stated: Can France, momentarily the strongest military nation in the world, permanently protect the small States liberated by the world war or, at the least, cover them until they have acquired strength to stand alone? Can she build out of these minor States, with Poland the chief detail, an alliance sufficient to check Russia on the Beresina, Germany along the lower Vistula, Italy along the Adriatic, thus leaving the existence of Poland and Jugo-Slavia? Or will she be forced to abandon the task, perhaps having to pay for her effort in loss of territory?

Beyond all question Germany will again seek to exclude the Poles from the Baltic and regain Posen and West Prussia. Russia will strike for the Baltic, Italy will continue to endeavor to establish her control of the Adriatic. All three of these problems are born of the new European settlement. Only France is vitally concerned in preserving the edifice of 1919-20; France and the little peoples then liberated and by an ironic turn of affairs: France, alone championing the rights of small States and seeking to perpetuate those circumstances which make the last war truly a war of liberation, finds herself accused on all sides of "imperialism."

Copyright, 1920, by the McClure Syndicate.

## Harding Proves Real Human Sort; Aims to Make World Friendlier Place

Continued from Preceding Page.

obtainable by harmonious action, by good understanding, by compromising differences and getting to something like a practical working basis of action. The American people can be driven, although they are willing to be led. There has been Wilson's great blunder.

"What do you really think about Cox?" "I don't know whether I ought to answer that. I have avoided any reference to Cox in the campaign, because this has been a contest of principles and not a struggle between the ambitions of men as I see it. Frankly, Jim Cox is a pretty good fellow. We are not bad friends by any means. He deserved the honor that came to him at San Francisco. He has fought according to his lights. Jim and I are birds of different feathers, that's all I can say."

"Senator, who were the three greatest men in American history?"

"Washington, Lincoln and Roosevelt," he replied like a shot.

"There's absolutely no doubt about the verdict of history in that respect. The late Col. Roosevelt and I fell apart in 1912. But I am proud to say that we came together again a few years later, and it will always be one of the happiest recollections of my life that it was to me the Colonel turned when the question of getting authority for his proposed division came up. I wish I could show you some of the letters that Col. Roosevelt wrote to me in that period of our national life when the United States seemed to tremble upon the brink of dishonor. I refused to use the words of this great dead man to assist me in the campaign. You have asked a question and I have answered it the best I could."

We talked about sport a little, the Senator admitting that he isn't the greatest golfer player in the world, nor yet the worst. "I'll tell the world that one day I did the

Chevy Chase course in 42," he laughed, "but there was a bit of luck at a hole or two. Ordinarily I go around in about 50. I used to play tennis a lot and I like the game, but it's a bit too strenuous for me nowadays."

And in this necessary closing comment, let it be written also that, if elected, he will take into the White House a sense of humor that will help him over many a hard place. He loves to laugh, dotes on a good story, and can tell one himself very entertainingly. The best times that Warren Harding ever has is when he can get away with Mrs. Harding and a few of his old married friends, climb out of the whole strutting, oppressive atmosphere that seems necessary to surround a public man of the first importance, and be his very delightful and natural self. This article is, in no sense, a slice of biography; otherwise many stories could be told of his moods and tenors in such hours of relaxation; good, human yarns they are too. The point is, that the people do not yet know the real Harding; the Harding of strong purpose and splendid character; the Harding that is willing to take advice, but insists on standing upon his own number nines; the Harding that loves to play with golf fellows; the Harding of manners extraordinarily polished for one brought up in a middle West community where the accent of life does not fall upon superlative grace; the Harding that believes that obligations of citizenship are coupled with social and political rights; the Harding that jokes and laughs with attractive ease; in short, the very true and sincere gentleman of quick grasping, thorough thinking mind who is now approaching his White House.

If it be true, as so often has been talked about the country, that the people "want a change," it is pretty certain that they will get what they want if they elect this man. For a more perfect antidote to Woodrow Wilson is not imaginable. Volumes of description and of character analysis lie in that statement.

## Many Amusing Items in Old Dictionary of Slang

A DULL but pertinacious reader once had Johnson's Dictionary lent him by a wagish friend as an interesting new work. He read it to the end and observed on returning it that the author was extremely well informed though his style was slightly disconnected. The remark is less absurd than it sounds, for a dictionary is not poor reading, especially a dictionary of slang.

When political speeches pall and the freshest clues to the Wall Street explosion grow stale, when even the latest evasions of prohibition fail to thrill, the reader "fed up" with an enlightened age can regain the genial flavor of the eighteenth century nowhere better than in "A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue" by one Capt. Francis Grose.

The New York Public Library, through a gift from a private collection, possesses a genuine unaltered reprint of the much sought after first edition (London 1785). Brought out just in time to escape the sobering influence of the French Revolution the first edition contains words and explanations which later were either omitted or softened.

Even in 1785, however, Capt. Grose felt obliged to include in his delightfully con-

ditional preface the following sop to convention:

"To prevent any charge of immorality being brought against this work the editor begs leave to observe that when an indelicate or immodest word has intruded itself for explanation he has endeavored to get rid of it in the most decent manner possible, and none have been admitted but such as either could not be left out without rendering the work incomplete or in some measure compensate by their wit for the trespass committed on decorum."

Doubtless present day censors would dispute with this display of virtue with a word not included in the author's compendium of slang. They would call it a "stall."

"The Vulgar Tongue," to quote further from the preface, "consists of two parts. The first is the canting language, called sometimes Pedlar's French or St. Giles's Greek; the second, those of burlesque phrases, quaint allusions and nicknames for persons, things and places which from long uninterrupted usage are made classical by prescription."

Words of the canting language are denoted by (cant.) in parentheses, and it is an interesting proof of the enduring qualities of thieves' "patter" that, with very few additions, the "Slang Dictionary of New York,

London and Paris," published in 1890 at the office of the National Police Gazette in this city and compiled by a New York detective, is identical with the cant list compiled by Francis Grose.

The second part of Grose's dictionary, the "burlesque terms," have been drawn, the preface declares, "from the most classical authorities; such as soldiers on the long march, seamen at the cap-stern, and the colloquies of a Gravesend boat. Many heroic sentences, expressing and inculcating a contempt for death, have been caught from the mouths of the applauding populace attending those triumphant processions up Holborn Hill with which many an unfortunate hero will lately finished his course."

Some readers of Grose's Dictionary will entertain ill-fitted desires that the original meaning of hob-nob were in use to-day. Under this entry is the following:

"HOB or NOB—Will you hob or nob with me? A question formerly in fashion at polite tables, signifying a request or challenge to drink a glass of wine with the proposer; if the party challenged answered nob, they were to choose whether white or red. This foolish custom is said to have originated in the days of good Queen Bess, thus, when great chimney were in fashion there was at each corner of the hearth or grate a small

elevated projection called the hob, and behind it a seat. In winter time the hear was placed on the hob to warm, and the cold beer was set on a small table, said to have been called the nob; so that the question, will you have hob or nob, seems only to have meant, will you have warm or cold beer, i. e., beer from the hob or beer from the nob."

"Moonshine," one learns, did not come out of Kentucky, but was first applied to white brandy smuggled off the coasts of Kent and Sussex.

"Lord" is slang for hunchback and dates back to the reign of Richard III., when several subjects afflicted with the royal deformity were created peers. This story is a graceful commentary on the character of the hunchbacked king and lightens the sinister figure of the stage.

"Gob," in cant language, is not sailor but mouth. "Gob sticks" are forks or spoons, and "gob strings" a bride. "Chant" is talk, and to-day "chant coveys" are reporters.

It is said of Capt. Francis Grose that his literary acquirements were far exceeded by his good humor, his conviviality and his friendship, and the only regret attached to the perusal of "A Classical Dictionary" is that one cannot recall its author from his jovial past and ask him if he will have hob or nob.